Village politics, culture and community-driven development: insights from Indonesia

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\textbf{Abstract}: Local governance arrangements often reflect culturally charged struggles for power as well as culturally motivated efforts to gain access to power. Yet current discussions around community-driven and decentralized development pay little attention to this nexus, at best reducing power to questions of material difference but overlooking the ways in which governance arrangements are contested. On the basis of research across three sites in Indonesia, this paper explores ways in which tensions between different cultural forms at a village level affect local governance arrangements. The conclusions explore implications for so-called community-driven approaches to development.

\textbf{Key words}: community-driven development, culture, decentralization, governance, Indonesia.

\section{The cultural lacunae of community-driven development}

Judging by the recent and passionate discovery at the World Bank of ‘community driven development’, decentralization fever (Tendler, 1997) is still in our midst

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(Dongier et al., 2002; World Bank, 2003). Of course, there are good reasons for becoming infected with this fever, for the decentralization of governance functions and resource allocation decisions to both municipal authorities and communities may indeed offer the prospect of increased and broader popular participation at a local level. However, there is no a priori reason to believe that this will be so: local authorities are not necessarily responsive to village demands, just as village authorities need not be representative of the majority of villagers. Yet it remains the case that too often both decentralization and community participation discussions presume the existence of a more or less homogeneous village of generally poor, excluded citizens all itching to work together in community development initiatives and village self-management if only the opportunity were to arise (Leach et al., 1999). Even if discussions of community-driven development make some reference to questions of exclusion within local populations (Dongier et al., 2002), the overall attention paid to power, conflict and politics within villages, and to the ways in which decentralization processes may intersect with such dynamics, is scant indeed (World Bank, 2003).

The 1990s saw several studies aiming to provide antidote to the excesses of decentralization fever. Comparative studies – within and across a range of country contexts – have shown quite clearly how the final effects of decentralization depend considerably on the power structures into which resources and roles are being devolved (Crook and Manor, 1994, 1998; Manor 1998; Harriss, 2001; also Fox, 1995). These more cautionary studies are important. However, they have tended to emphasize the ways in which social structures and the material bases of power affect decentralization processes – with a focus, furthermore, on the municipal or provincial scales. Rather less attention has been given to the extent to which tensions among different cultural forms at yet more local levels might also affect the ways in which local governance institutions perform and allocate resources. There are many possible reasons for this relative lack of attention. ‘Culture’ can seem an all too slippery, interpretative and potentially conservative concept for those concerned with nitty-gritty questions of institutional design and fiscal transfers – and perhaps also for those who trace their intellectual roots to political economy and peasant studies. Meanwhile, others more attuned to questions of culture may have steered clear of engaging in ‘culture and development’ discussions because of the mechanistic and simplistic ways in which culture is often treated as a ‘resource’, a store of knowledge, techniques and practices that can be mobilized in the pursuit of externally defined development goals (Radcliffe, 2001; see also Escobar, 1991). Indeed, the chapter on community-driven development for the World Bank’s Poverty reduction strategy sourcebook refers to culture as a potential source of skills, as ethnicity and as values – not as a realm of contention (Dongier et al., 2002). Too often, culture has been invoked without any simultaneous attention to questions of power (Lewis et al., 2003).

Certain cultural anthropologists have pursued the complex relationships between culture, power and development in more rigorous and nuanced ways (see, for instance: Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Li, 1999b; Moore, 1999), with a view to speaking to more theoretical debates on culture/power and politics (e.g., Dirks and Ortner, 1994). In this paper we do not take our analysis in this direction nor engage in deeply theorized discussions of cultural politics (though this is an important project in critical development studies). We do, however, draw on some insights of these discussions in order to explore ways in which practices loaded with meaning affect the dynamics of village politics and governance in ways that...
do not map easily onto the material bases of social power. In this sense we understand culture as a realm of meanings, values and identities, but one whose significance can never be detached from relationships of power. We also argue that governance is a cultural as much as an administrative process, and that to recognize this opens up avenues for reflecting on the possible effects of community-driven development initiatives and the ways in which they might be resisted and reworked at the village level.

All this implies the value of broadening theorizations of the ‘local’ within current discussions of community-driven development. Not only is it important to recognize that the local is not ‘a site hermetically sealed off from relational, translocal linkages’ (Moore, 1999: 656), nor that the community is not homogeneous (Leach et al., 1999). It is also important to understand that the local is a site of struggles over cultural practice – struggles that are embedded in social networks and governance institutions and whose nature and outcomes affect the nature of village-level power. Community-driven development and decentralization programmes need to pay attention to these village-level tensions between cultural forms – for in the presence of such tensions, local development initiatives can easily aggravate potentially complex conflicts. In this sense we speak to the literature on community development more than that in cultural anthropology.

The paper proceeds as follows. First we discuss the research underlying this argument. Secondly we present a framework for thinking about the relationships between culture and local governance. Thirdly we present three cases (two from Central Java and one from the province of Jambi in Sumatra) in which we illustrate the ways in which formal institutions of village governance have both reworked, and have been reworked by institutions linked to cultural practices. Fourthly and finally we close with a discussion of the implications of these observations for current discussions of community-driven development.

II Local-level institutions and village development in Indonesia

This paper is based on two studies addressing the relationships between local institutions, poverty and village governance in rural Indonesia. The first study, conducted between 1996 and 1997, aimed first to generate descriptive information on the role that village institutions played in villagers’ lives, secondly to trace the relationships between these institutions and household-level welfare (Grootaert, 1999) and thirdly to understand the interactions between state-sponsored and nonstate organizations and groups in patterns of village-level development. Research was conducted in two districts (kabupaten) in each of three provinces (Central Java, Jambi and Nusa Tenggara Timur or NTT), selected in order to pursue relationships in different political economic and cultural contexts.

The same villages and households were then restudied between 1999 and 2002. Though methodologically and substantively similar, the restudy paid greater attention to understanding the ways in which state and nonstate institutions interacted locally, and the ways in which this affected village governance both before and after the economic crisis of 1998 and the end of Suharto’s New Order government. While methodologically similar the second study involved more extensive qualitative work in order to investigate these questions. Six-week qualitative studies were...
conducted in five villages (one per district). These paid particular attention to dynamics of village politics and the different ways in which villagers organized and engaged with village government. Initially these studies were referred to as ‘mini-ethnographies’. We do not use this term here as they did not meet the standards of thick ethnography. However, they were far more than rural appraisals in several respects: they involved six weeks’ continuous presence in a district, follow-up visits and interviews and used a number of classic ethnographic techniques, such as participant observation, open-ended interviews and attention to daily practices. In each district, research was conducted by teams of two Indonesian researchers. Each researcher focused on particular themes but shared insights at the end of each day. Expatriate Indonesian researchers moved among the different study sites, fostering communication among the research experiences and themes emerging in each site.

These qualitative studies constitute the principal source of information for the discussion here, but are complemented by other information. First, following an initial processing of these studies, week-long rural appraisal exercises were conducted in all 40 villages studied, again with three teams of researchers. These rapid appraisals were then followed by a survey of 1200 households. These subsequent research visits enabled further open-ended interviewing and observation. Finally the lead researchers for each province revisited the sites on several occasions up to mid-2002, allowing them to track processes and conflicts identified earlier in the research.

### III Culture and governance: practices, institutions and meanings

Some would argue that ‘there is no such thing as culture’ (Mitchell, 1995), but rather only power that manifests itself in a range of discourses and practices. Still, there is some utility (as authors such as Escobar, 1995, suggest) in retaining the notion that people defend, and mobilize around, practices and institutions that are particularly meaningful to them. At certain times this mobilization may involve dealing with formal village governance structures. A corollary notion is that people may also resist institutions and practices that convey or embody meanings they find disagreeable. While such resistance may, of course, be to the exercise of material power, it may also be resistance to the imposition of institutions and practices that convey different meanings and values from those embodied in those practices that are most familiar and significant to the groups concerned. Such resistance may not be successful, but it will affect village governance processes.

Cultural practices are embedded in networks of social relationships. These networks make the practices both possible (you cannot gamble or fight cocks against yourself) and meaningful (as the practices become markers of belonging both within the network as well as within the broader translocal community within which the network exists). Such networks can also constitute the basis for other (related or not) forms of social action – such as actions, for instance, that seek to create an environment that will allow such cultural practices to continue to exist. Examples here could include using the network to gain access to the financial resources necessary to allow soccer leagues to continue to exist, or to manipulate the legal environment in instances where the practices involved would be deemed illegal by formal law. More assertively, the networks may also be vehicles for seeking to
project these cultural practices more broadly, to others who currently are not involved (a projection that can also, quite easily, become impositional). Examples here can range from trying to broaden the scope of a soccer league by getting other villages to create soccer teams, to attempts to require other villages to participate in particular forms of religious practice and ritual.

For these different reasons, the networks that sustain cultural practices are likely to interact with the formal institutions of village government, be this because these cultural practices are regulated by village government or because the networks involved engage with village government institutions to seek their resources, to manipulate them (via corruption, vote-getting or some other mechanism), to seek their protection or for some other reason. To the extent that the practices sustained by these networks have particular significance in people’s lives, then this can mean that the networks (and organizations linked to them) become important collective actors within village politics, and one of the main determinants of postures taken by formal governance institutions in the village.

Equally, however, the formal institutions of village governance can distort and disable the networks that make possible certain cultural practices. Where groups controlling formal governance institutions view such practices as a threat that can be dealt with without running too much risk of generating unmanageable forms of resistance, then the likelihood that they will deliberately aim to disable them is greater. However, to the extent that the cultural practices at stake are particularly significant and volatile ones (as, for instance, in the case of practices linked to religious beliefs and institutions), such resistance has the potential to spill over into wider and serious conflict. Indeed, the fact that a number of the cultural forms discussed in the cases below relate to broader cultural tensions and conflicts in contemporary Indonesia is a reminder that – while for the purpose of this paper our focus is local – these villages (and organizations and networks within them) are linked to other localities in Indonesia and beyond (cf. Moore, 1999), a point to which we return in Section V.

The networks that sustain meaningful practices can thus become significant vehicles for political action. As a corollary, the institutions that sustain formal village governance procedures also convey meaning within the village. In rural Indonesia, one might reasonably argue that village government organizations convey meanings associated with modernization, authoritarianism, surveillance, integration, development and (outside Java) Javanization (Evers, 2000). Indeed, it merits note that the (authoritarian and repressive) New Order regime of Suharto (1965–1998) aggressively and systematically appropriated the symbols and language of Javanese culture in much of what it did. Not only did this facilitate the process through which the regime embedded itself politically in Javanese village life (simultaneously making the exercise of power meaningful and exercising power though meaning), it also made the practice of government – at all levels – an exercise in Javanization and thus an integral component of an effort to manage cultural diversity across the Indonesian archipelago. Although this project ultimately failed it left a heritage of governance institutions to be resisted and reworked as much for the meanings infused in them as for any other reason. This further complicates attempts to reform governance processes in the post Suharto period.

If it is the case that formal organizations and practices of village government are embedded in networks sustaining cultural practices as well as in contested ideas about how government should be practiced, then any development intervention...
that aims to reform or work through formal village institutions immediately becomes involved in these cultural tensions, privileging some meanings and social groups, excluding others – as the New Order regime understood perfectly. Having argued this point conceptually, we now do so empirically. In the following section, we review cases from three localities in Central Java and Jambi that illuminate just how far cultural tensions affect village governance.

IV Cultural tensions and village governance in rural Indonesia: Central Java and Jambi

1 Village governance in context: a brief history

Notwithstanding their remarkable ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity, Indonesia’s more than 70 000 villages operated, until very recently, under a single administrative structure (at least ostensibly). This structure, modelled on the governance institutions of Javanese villages, was introduced by the Village Government Law (known as Law No. 5 of 1979), which remained in place until 1999 when it was revoked following the fall of the New Order regime. Even though the law has been revoked, most villages maintain the institutions it introduced.

Law 5/1979 was issued because older regulations, many derived from colonial laws, were deemed by the New Order government to be inadequate for the government’s plan to accelerate rural development. An explanatory text attached to the law commented, ‘those [old] laws and regulations did not create uniformity in village government and did not stimulate the community to develop. Therefore the present villages and village governments have various forms and structures; each area has its own characteristics which often hinder intensive upgrading and control to improve the community’s welfare’. In response to this, the New Order regime introduced a uniform structure for village governance for the whole of Indonesia. The centrepiece of this was the village (or desa) and the village leader (kepala desa). The desa was in turn subdivided into hamlets or subvillages, called dusun, each of which also had their leader who answered directly to the kepala desa.

True to the intent of making village institutions functional to national programmes of rural development and political surveillance, the Law stipulated that the kepala desa be accountable not to the community but to the district head (acting on behalf of the Governor of the province). The kepala desa only had to explain their administration to the Lembaga Musyawarah Desa (the LMD or ‘village community consultative council’), which was anyway headed by the kepala desa. The village head also chaired another organization, the Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa (the LKMD, or ‘village community resilience council’). As stipulated in a Presidential Decree in 1980, the LKMD was responsible for implementing development projects. Members of these two organizations were more or less selected by the village head. In sum, village regulations ‘allow[ed] the villagers a role, but give the village head the final word, and just to make sure, give the district head the right to “veto” everything’ (Evers, 2000: 14). Later the central government also created other ‘community’ groups (women’s and youth groups, in particular). These were supposed to be present in every village and played a mix of community, development and surveillance roles. Throughout the country, other organizations, such as cooperatives, farmers’
associations and especially groups affiliated to political parties, were replaced by ones
sponsored by government (Hüskén and White, 1989). With so much control in the
hands of the institutions introduced by and responsive to the central state, ‘auton-
omous’ and self-generated community groups were given little space to grow, and tra-
tditional adat institutions were also marginalized. The services and functions that such
groups had delivered prior to the New Order government became the responsibility of
these government-sponsored organizations, to which, furthermore, most government
resources flowed. Rural development was, in this schema, driven by the state and
rural elites (Antlöv, 1995; Zakaria, 2000).

Significantly, in addition to being an effort to create chain-like mechanisms
through which the central state could implement a programme of authoritarian
modernization, this re-engineering of village-level institutions was also part of an
attempt to Javanize the archipelago. There were many mechanisms for such
Javanization including both the ‘transmigration’ of Javanese people to other islands
and also the legislated imposition of more or less Javanese institutions of village
government, social organization and social control. Thus, not only were these new
institutions mechanisms for helping national institutions ‘participate’ in the
governance of village life while closing out channels for villagers to participate in
the governance of national life; outside Java they also replaced culturally and
geographically specific, traditional (adat) forms of authority and organization.
Traditional leaders lost the material basis to their power and authority, and generally
became ineffective or ‘co-opted’ into the village government. Local, culturally rooted
resistance to this Javanized modernization did occur (cf. Scott, 1985) just as resistance
to authoritarianism occurred within Java, but the likelihood that such resistance
might lead to significant change in local politics was limited, until the late 1990s,
when Suharto was forced by national protests to step down. When this occurred
in 1998, his successor revoked the existing Village Government Law and replaced it
with new legislation (Number 22 of 1999). This new law, hastily prepared and
unclear in parts, introduced more liberal conceptions of local governance and
opened space for diversity in forms of government, giving the village community
the chance of playing a larger role in their development. Inter alia, the community
is free to return to its local customs (albeit in ways still regulated by the district
government), and the village head is now accountable to the Badan Perwakilan Desa
(BPD, or village representative body) instead of to the district head.

While changes have not derived instantly from these new laws and regulations,
the scope for contesting local power has widened, as has the likelihood that already
existing power bases will manage to find new ways to ensure that village govern-
ment continues to work in their favour. In such a context it becomes interesting
to consider some of the ways in which power has been exercised in villages, and
the cultural practices, institutions and idioms through which these struggles
have been expressed and that have been produced by these struggles. The next
three subsections describe three illustrative cases.

2 Village governance and religious tensions in Central Java

The first case comes from Walet, a poor, low-lying village in the subdistrict of
Banyumas. In village statistics, all villagers are recorded as Moslem though not all
practice. Some of those who are not are known as abangan, mostly living in dusun, Plumbon. The remainder, a minority, are scattered across Walet’s three other dusuns: Tambaksari, Depok and Malangan.

In three of the four dusuns, abangan and orthodox Moslems manage their differences without significant tension, but in Tambaksari relationships have in recent years become more tense. The effect of this has spilled into dusun politics and, indeed, into village-wide politics and governance processes. The point of contention has been around baritan, a ceremony to honour the ancestors and ask for their protection and in which people present the favourite cultural shows of the ancestors. While in Plumbon, Depok and Malangan the ceremony is relatively simple, in Tambaksari the ritual is more significant, and the orthodox Moslem population viewed it as musyrik (i.e., acknowledging gods other than Allah by asking for blessings or protection from the ancestors). Furthermore, it was considered an expensive waste of funds that placed a burden on all households in the subvillage. The abangan, meanwhile, insisted that it was a tradition that villagers should take care of so as to keep the village peaceful.

In the face of this resistance, Tambaksari’s hamlet head had not called a baritan during most of the 1990s on the grounds that not everybody wanted to have it (in particular the orthodox Moslems). This, in turn, would have meant that he would have had to do most of the organizing himself, and would have been left to pay most of the expenses because those who were against the ritual would have refused to contribute to its costs. The decline of baritan became a source of tension in the dusun: ‘If they don’t want to contribute to our event, then why should we help the next time they want to build a mosque?’ commented one abangan leader.

The contention between the abangan and the Moslems spilled over into village elections in 1999, which pitted an abangan candidate against an orthodox Moslem. The Moslem candidate called for a more or less sectarian vote, while the abangan built a campaign agenda that was explicitly aimed at capturing the abangan vote plus a share of the Moslem vote by offering to: repair the road connecting Tambaksari and Depok (in order to capture Moslem votes in Tambaksari); build an irrigation canal and water outlets to prevent annual floods (to capture village-wide support); and revive the baritan (in order to capture abangan support in Tambaksari and Plumbon).

The abangan candidate won the election, bringing in significant support in Tambaksari and Plumbon. Abangan cultural leaders in Tambaksari saw this as a base from which to push for the revival of the baritan. Yet when the abangan then arranged a village meeting to discuss the revival of baritan in Tambaksari, the discussion was ultimately dominated by orthodox Moslems who were, moreover and importantly, wealthier, younger, better educated and more eloquent than the older and somewhat poorer abangan who attended. The meeting voted not to revive the baritan.

The tensions surrounding baritan in Tambaksari fed into discussions of the future organization of Walet. The village’s only means of raising revenue to support village development is to rent out village-owned rice fields. Yet most of these fields are allocated to village and hamlet authorities as an in-kind payment for their village duties. The village representative council (whose income is, in turn, proportional to village revenue) thus suggested reducing the number of hamlets from four to two, in order to reduce the number of authorities and so reduce the amount of land that would be allocated to them – which, in turn, would leave more land for renting
out and so raising village revenue. Under this proposal, Tambaksari would have been merged with Plumbon, yet Plumbon rejected the proposal on the grounds that if they were to merge with Tambaksari, they would also become subject to the decision not to revive *baritan* and so would be unable to celebrate it. In addition, they were almost certain that the *dusun* head would be from Tambaksari, whose population was better off than that of Plumbon.

Unpicking the dynamics of village politics in Walet is complex, and the shifting manoeuvres and efforts to capture or lobby village and *dusun* governance institutions cannot be explained only in terms of religious identity and arguments over *baritan*. Evidently in each of these arguments, questions of class difference and material interest were as much at play as were questions of cultural practice. But the struggle to regulate *baritan* was evidently influential in all these conflicts. At the very least *baritan* presented an idiom in which material interests could be struggled over without being spoken of explicitly. But more than that, the struggle for and against *baritan* also motivated people to engage politically in different spheres of village governance. It would be difficult to understand Walet’s village politics without also understanding the different meanings that *baritan* held for different groups in the village.

3 Gambling and village politics in Central Java

The second example comes from Beral,11 a village in the most southern part of District Wonogiri, located by the sea and at the border between two provinces, Central Java and East Java. It has ten *dusuns*, five in the north and five in the south, with over 3600 people and a culturally liberal woman as village head who used to be the principal of one of the three village elementary schools. The village is relatively poor, although not the poorest in the subdistrict. The main economic activities are rainfed rice farming, coconut sugar home-industry (which supplies villagers with daily cash) and, as in the case of many villages in Wonogiri, ‘exporting’ labour to cities as circular migrants. Between 20 and 50 people in each subvillage are circular migrants. Their main destinations are Solo, Yogyakarta, Jakarta and other cities in Java.

On beginning our qualitative work in Beral we went first to see the head of the *kecamatan* (the *camat*) for a ‘courtesy call’.12 Among the first thing the *camat* talked to us about was gambling in Beral. At almost every party (*hajatan*) to which he was invited, he said, there would be a gambling session. While people generally gambled after he left, he knew that gambling was very popular, albeit generally hidden because it is illegal.

Our first encounter with gambling in Beral was also at a party, to celebrate the circumcision of a child relative of the village head. The *kepala desa* asked us to go with her and her partner in the evening and, during the event, a group of people played the game in the next room while a bigger crowd was watching. Our second encounter was also at a party, which we attended, again with the village head, her partner and her child grandson. This time the gambling was in the same room as us, slightly away from where we were sitting, eating and talking with some women. The gambling involved a few people playing cards, one of whom was a school teacher and another a *dusun* head. When we were saying goodnight to our host, the *kepala desa* said that her grandson had to go to bed soon so as not to be
late for school the next day. Her partner lightly commented, ‘Oh, don’t worry. His teacher is still here gambling’.

This permissive attitude toward gambling, at least to the eye of an outsider, indicates the extent to which it is regarded as a part of everyday life in the village. Many people we talked to argued that it was a tradition, and it was indeed an important part of the annual rasulan, a celebration to the ancestors who first lived in the village (or subvillage) and are now represented by a huge banyan tree (known as dhanyang). With the celebration, villagers believe that their ancestors will protect them through the year and bring good harvests. If they fail to observe it, woes will befall them (e.g., death and accident). Rasulan is especially remarkable in Beral because of the scale of this collective celebration and the form it takes in one of the dusun, Joglo.13

In a typical celebration of rasulan people clean the public places in the village (or subvillage), such as the cemetery and the place around the dhanyang. In the evening they gather in one place, such as the house of the subvillage head, bringing garnished cone-shape rice with other dishes as offerings. Someone (usually a religious leader or someone who has knowledge about the tradition) leads a prayer, then people eat the meal together and continue to stay awake all night long (mainly the males) – a part of the rite to stay alert against bad spirits.

In Joglo, the celebration is much more elaborate. Offerings include the ancestor’s favourite foods and sports, such as cock-fighting. At the cock-fight, people place bets and other kinds of gambling ensue. Migrants return home for the celebration and gamblers come from as far away as the city of Wonosari (a two hour drive away in another province). In 2000, each of 75 households in the subvillage contributed Rp15 000 to pay for all expenses, including a significant payment to the police to ensure the celebration was not raided.14 The dishes were cooked and paid for by women in groups of four to six. The celebration started on Thursday night15 with a game of gambling in the house of the subvillage head who was known as a major botoh (gambling master). The prayer, offerings (meals) and cock-fights were held throughout the following day. In the evening the puppet show was held and, at the same time, the gambling continued by the banyan tree. There were several groups playing at the same time. Some catered to the ‘small’ gamblers with bets of up to Rp10 000, others to mid-size gamblers with bets up to Rp50 000, and still others for the major gamblers whose bets exceeded Rp50 000. Each time people bet, 10% would be deducted for the kitty. Some people were assigned to collect the money, which would be used for the subvillage activities or whatever the subvillage (the head and neighbourhood leaders) agreed to.

While rasulan is the occasion in which people can safely justify their ‘illegal’ activity, gambling, be it for small, occasional gamblers (‘who have time to kill’) or for big, serious ones (‘who expect the game to generate substantial income in cash and in kind’), takes place frequently. People gamble when they want to stay awake all night (cagak lek) as a ritual or to accompany sick people, wait for a woman in labour or socialize with neighbours over coffee. The types of game also vary, though most use dice and cards. The bets can be in cash (small bets for occasional gamblers) or in kind, such as cigarettes, packs of ramen (instant noodle) or a pair of shoes. Gamblers also bet on the results of village-head elections (in their own and other villages) and may pay voters to vote for the person on whom they have placed their bet. When there are no parties on which they can piggyback, serious gamblers decide among themselves where and when to meet, usually
in the evening. They move from one place to another, deciding the venue among themselves.

Gamblers and nongamblers estimated that approximately 70–90% of the villagers gamble. While most are only occasional gamblers, some estimate that 10% are more serious. This gambling community is a mixed group – there are both big and small farmers, traders, teachers, village officials and policemen. Hence the comment of the kepala desa that ‘gambling is safe here. How can’t it be? The local police head is a gambling master. How could you expect me to stop gambling?’ Though the village head did not gamble, when she had a party she allowed people to gamble in her home.

Of the ten most frequently cited big gamblers, 50% are village officials (including subvillage heads). At least four of the ten are relatives of the village head. When we saw one of the subvillage heads leaving his house in the evening, a neighbour remarked, ‘The subvillage head is off to do his business’, which people understand as going to his evening gambling. He is the one to contact when a villager wants to have a party/celebration and gambling games in his place. This subvillage head would tell his fellow gamblers the date and venue of the next meeting through word of mouth or by using the public transportation drivers as messengers. ‘It’s amazing how fast they spread the news. It’s more effective than a cell phone’, said one community leader. Out-of-village gamblers include village heads and business people. It is not unusual for the host of the party to not know every single guest but the more people come, the more prestigious the party and the more gifts (many in cash) the host receives.

One of the reasons for the tolerance of gambling is because it brings money into the subvillage – it is a local form of resource mobilization. When asked why the subvillage head did not do anything to stop gambling in one villager’s house, another villager would say, ‘because they contribute to the subvillage treasury, otherwise we would stop them’. The kitty is usually divided among the host who also provides snacks and drinks, the subvillage and the local police. On one occasion, the local military asked for a contribution from the gamblers to refurbish their office in return for military protection. In the subvillage the money is used to repair roads, culverts, build a sentry, etc.

A major source of support to gambling, however indirect, is the village head. She said, ‘I did not give permission to gambling, but I did not disband it, either. I just let them do it but they should make sure there is no fight or anything that might disturb the neighbourhood’. Indeed, she would tell gamblers when she heard there would be an out-of-town police raid and she also asked them to stop gambling before dawn and they obeyed her. In this relationship, then, the village head allows people to gamble, and even protects them, and the gamblers contribute to subvillage finances and do not create disturbances (which is important for any village head’s reputation). The village head also derived other direct benefits from the gamblers’ network. Before the fall of the New Order, in which Golkar, the ruling party, had to win in every general election (and the village head would receive direct benefits if they did), she went to the gamblers and asked them to vote for Golkar. In her own re-election campaign, 50% of her ‘vote getters’ (including the coordinator) were serious gamblers. She won by a landslide.

Gambling is a culturally significant practice in Beral – both in its own terms and in terms of its relationship to other institutions, such as rasulan. It is sustained by social networks that bind its practitioners and link them to other actors and institutions.
In particular, gamblers both come from village government and have developed links to its institutions in order that they may provide protection to gambling. Indeed, the functioning of village government in Beral – who is in it, who is kepala desa, how it is resourced – only makes sense in terms of its relationship to the networks that undergird gambling.

4 Cultural tensions and traditional governance institutions in Jambi

The final short example comes from the village of Koto Depati in the province of Jambi. Located on one of the most fertile areas in the province, Koto Depati had been relatively isolated until 1996, when the existing dirt track was asphalted to connect the village and its neighbours to the district capital. Since 1997, indigenous villagers have attempted to revive its traditional (adat) governance system, known as Depati Gento Rajo (DGR), which is also the title of the leader. DGR and the formal leaders (the village head and the LKMD) have issued a series of village regulations regarding, inter alia, adultery, procedures for conflict resolution and land transactions. This phenomenon is interesting given that the New Order regime had attempted to delegitimize the adat system through Law 5 of 1979 (which, as noted earlier, was revoked in 1999). How can this revival – and the associated shifts in the relationships between culture and governance – be interpreted?

One consequence of the new road to Koto Depati has been the influx of land-hungry migrants (pendatang) from the neighbouring district (Kerinci) and provinces (South Sumatra and Bengkulu), as well as from Java. Although the village has a long history of accommodating such pendatang, the rate of in-migration since 1997 has been unprecedented. The increasing number of pendatang has led to the creation of a new hamlet and the opening of large dry fields (ladang) in what used to be forest land. This has created tensions in the community – yet, at the same time, the presence of pendatang also implies new opportunities for village residents. The shift in local governance processes since 1997 can be understood as an effort to negotiate these opportunities and tensions.

Prior to 1996, pendatang usually had to apply to become members of the adat community. By doing so they would gain similar benefits to those of the indigenous population, such as the rights to open forest for a dry field and a site to build a house, as well as to vote in local elections. To become a member of the adat community, a pendatang would have to have a foster father (tengganai) and undergo a set of adat-sponsored rituals hosted by his tengganai and him, symbolizing both his intention to become a good member of the community and the acceptance of him by the host community. For the adat community, a tengganai is responsible for teaching his foster child the adat rules and making sure that he accepts all the consequences of being a member of the community. Having undergone these rituals, the pendatang would gradually accrue all rights and responsibilities inherent in his new status. Since the late 1990s, however, as the stock of uncultivated adat land has declined significantly as a result of natural population growth and the establishment of a national park in the area, new members now only have the right to buy land from fellow community members.

Pendatang who have no plan to become members of the adat community, still come to work as anak ladang (agricultural workers), which enables them and the host
community to observe one another before any decision is made to apply to become a member or, for the community, to accept a new member. *Anak ladang* is a person who works on the *ladang of induk semang* (the landlord/landowner) in return for a share of the harvest.¹⁹ The arrangement allows both parties to respond to the growing market demand (stimulated by the road) for commercial crops (such as potato, vegetables and coffee) whose planting system was introduced by the new *pendatang*. Successful *anak ladang* (and the landowners) are able to accumulate capital and start buying land – a phenomenon that also increases the pressure on land availability and price.

In this process, land ownership has become progressively more polarized. The number of those who no longer have, or possess less than, 1 ha of *ladang* is growing, as is the number of people with more than 5 ha. The *kepala desa*, for instance, has acquired 30 ha of additional *ladang* in less than five years. Increasing control of land by the *pendatang* has in the last few years begun to worry the local ruling elites. In 2000 the *adat* council, the LKMD and the village head collectively issued a decree that land transactions with the *pendatang* were deemed illegal unless approved by the village head. This decree appears to reflect the revival of the *adat* governance system and constitutes an effort to maintain *adat* rule over the community. However, a closer investigation showed that the decree also benefited the indigenous elite, because it took *pendatang* out of the land market and so pushed land prices down. This elite has bought land aggressively during this period of agricultural commercialization.²⁰ The pretext given for this is that (in the words of one) ‘We want to save the land from the *pendatang*. . . . All of us indigenous villagers are of one ancestor and therefore one big family. If we buy the land, we’ll keep it in the family and later, when the original owner, who is our family member, wants to have it back, we can sell it to him’. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that the accumulation is instead linked to increased elite expenditure on both ‘modern’ goods and services and higher education (outside the village). The *kepala desa*, for instance, is already financing three children through high school and another through university.

The *pendatang* have contested this shift in governance arrangements. Some have attempted to mobilize national law against this re-instatement of *adat* land law. One *pendatang* from South Sumattra, who is married to a local woman and who has purchased tens of hectares of *ladang* in the last four years, argues that under the national law and practice, every citizen has the right to buy land anywhere in the country.²¹ Other *pendatang* also complained that the *adat* rules benefit only indigenous villagers and preserve the local political regime. One *pendatang* complained that when he fished in a local lake he was fined a *gantang* of rice (equal to 2.5 kg) and a chicken by the DGR’s police (*Dubalang*), while a resident would only be verbally reprimanded. This contention between the *pendatang* and indigenous elites has continued and has most recently been manifested in a call by the *pendatang* to divide the village into two. The new village would have a larger proportion of *pendatang* and nonelite indigenous villagers who are unhappy with the elite bias of the current governance system.

Interpreting all the nuances of these recent efforts to re-establish locally generated, traditional governance institutions goes beyond the scope of this discussion. Nevertheless, it is clear that the revival of such institutions reflects an effort to preserve the old regime favouring village elites in the face of competition from inmigrants. In an attempt (that has been partially successful) to increase village acceptance of changes in local governance arrangements, these elites have mobilized
cultural arguments around ideas of adat and tradition. Yet, at the same time, such arguments are only partially successful and have been resisted by both pendatang and some poorer indigenous villagers.

V Culture, governance and local development

While in these three case studies the specific intersections between cultural forms and village politics are distinct, we suggest that there are also general principles at stake. In this closing section we outline some of these principles, draw out their theoretical, policy and methodological considerations and discuss the implications for current discussions of community-driven development.

Perhaps the most generic principle from the cases is that local governance arrangements are imbued with meaning and are, at the same time, a privileged site for struggles over meaning (cf. Carney and Watts, 1990). To the extent that they constitute formal sources of state-sanctioned power, these arrangements are thus particularly interesting sites in which to explore the relationships between culture and power. Yet, arguably, such ethnographic explorations of local government institutions are far fewer than are explorations of the culture/power nexus within social movements and other forms of resistance (cf. Bebbington and Bebbington, 2001). Discussions of governance remain dominated by political science and public administration – it is perhaps, therefore, unsurprising that governance reforms (including decentralization strategies) seem so often blind to questions of cultural politics.

Yet the cases make clear that governance and cultural politics are, at least at the local level, deeply entwined with each other. They demonstrate, for instance, how individual and collective actors seek to influence the people and organizations that have formal influence over local governance in ways that are motivated by practices and beliefs that are particularly meaningful to them. Such influence is manifest in different ways: varying patterns of resistance to and acceptance of adat governance institutions in Koto Depati; channelling resources to and peddling political support for authorities in village government in the case of gambling in Beral; advocacy, political campaigning and later the running of candidates for these same positions of village authority in the case of Walet. These influences affect decisions made (or not made) in village government, the ways in which village government practices its roles of surveillance and regulation, and on whose behalf it governs.

These cases also suggest that some of the most significant influences on who occupies positions of local authority, on how they govern and on how they are able to mobilize and allocate resources are not easily and immediately read off from differentials in the material bases of social power. Rather, local struggles – or, at times, local silences – may have as much to do with the exercise, protection and projection of certain cultural practices. While patterns of participation in these cultural practices may be related to general patterns of asset distribution, this is not necessarily or always the case. Indeed, cross-class networks linked to these practices can and do emerge, and can and do seek to influence formal governance processes to protect practices that are deemed especially meaningful within these networks. This is a reminder that power has many sources and is exercised
for many purposes. This multifarious nature of power influences not only formal local politics but also the ways in which a range of institutions function (Moore, 1999) – in the cases noted here, it has influenced how village government, the police, the military, the Mosque and other such institutions have operated and interacted with each other.

The cases also raise important issues regarding the links between culture, power and scale. Reflecting our interest in speaking to discussions of decentralized development in which resources and formal powers are devolved to administratively defined scales, we have focused on a notion of ‘local’ that is linked to village and subdistrict scales. However, the cultural forms and meanings discussed in the cases are not simply village or subdistrict phenomena. They reflect far wider-reaching struggles within contemporary Indonesia: between and among forms of Islam and of secularism; between and among migrants and long-term residents; between and among adat and modern-secular governance institutions. The possibility that these cultural tensions may spill over into more generalized violence is very real – and to the extent that such violence revolves around conflicting meanings of state and nation they would call into question the very viability of Indonesia as a country. Just as real is the possibility that decentralizing resources and powers into such conflicts may, in some locations, heighten tensions and ultimately trigger conflict whose socio-political effects could resonate far beyond the local administrative unit. This is particularly significant in contemporary Indonesia where the ‘imagined’ idea of nation (Anderson, 1983) that helped keep Indonesia together becomes ever less stable. Put simply, it is more than possible that devolving resources into localities where national conflicts over meaning are particularly charged could precipitate changes with national consequences. In such a scenario, to give more nuanced and theoretical thought to what constitutes ‘the local’ is not a superfluous exercise in academic indulgence for which ‘practical’ minds ought not spare the time – it is instead critical to the possibility that community-driven development may ever deliver on its concerns to reduce poverty and empower the poor.

This takes us back to policy questions and current discussions of community-driven development. Most simply the implication is that the village absolutely cannot be assumed to be a relatively homogeneous entity in which social differences are (in relative terms at least) any less extreme than elsewhere. These arguments complement those of Leach et al. (1999) who insist on the importance of understanding communities as internally differentiated and argue that this differentiation will influence the final forms taken by any effort to foster community-based natural resource management. Our analysis shows that a particularly important axis of difference within communities relates to the meanings around which people will mobilize and struggle. It suggests that such differences are just as important as material- and asset-based ones in influencing how village institutions operate and thus in determining the outcomes of village-based approaches to development.

For these same reasons, it cannot be assumed that community-driven approaches to development will per se increase the possibilities for broader-based participation in political, social and economic processes – and that indeed, in certain instances, they may exacerbate the exclusion of locally disempowered groups from access to public decision-making processes and public resources. More importantly, the cases show how certain mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and channels through which political influence is exercised, may not be easily visible unless a
range of (sometimes initially hidden) cultural practices and meanings are considered. This suggests that in the design of local governance reform programmes it is important to invest up front in slightly more extended periods of qualitative research that aim to explore these hidden forms and sources of power and the ways in which they affect local institutions (cf. Lewis, 1999; Markowitz, 2001, on studying NGOs). It also implies that any conceptualization of governance reforms must recognize not only that the forms they take will be mediated through existing cultural practices and power relationships but also that the reforms themselves constitute culturally specific and loaded expressions of how power ought be exercised formally.

The cultural tensions explored in the cases also affect the possibilities for the coproduction of services and governance that might occur at a village level (cf. Ostrom, 1996), influencing the types of service delivery and local resource mobilization arrangements that are most likely to be successful in particular local contexts. Yet, when institutional arrangements in community-driven development have been discussed, options are generally couched in terms of the nature of the good to be provided and the differential capacities of government, private and community-based actors to provide it (Dongier et al., 2002). These are clearly important factors in determining design options, but the cases also make clear that the dynamics of village cultural politics influence which types of organization may work together (and which not) in service delivery and the planning of local development – and also which types of cultural tension could be amplified if some organizations are included in service delivery while others are excluded.

None of this is to claim that increasing up-front qualitative research, or the insights that may stem from it, will resolve the problems at stake – power–culture constellations will always aim to take over and manipulate any programme of local development, and redefine the meanings given to local governance arrangements. But the simple recognition that there are links between governance, culture and power and that the potential significance of these links often reaches far beyond the local level is valuable in and of itself. Combined with an enhanced knowledge of how such relationships work out in practice, such recognition may contribute to local development arrangements that build in mechanisms that help identify processes of institutional colonization and capture at an earlier stage, and allow them to be discussed publicly in ways that can diffuse emerging conflicts, and steadily help create a local public sphere. Making more visible and more debatable what is less visible and unspeakable must surely be a step in the direction of deepening democracy. Too many discussions of decentralized and community-driven development – by eliding reflections on the relationships between culture and power – seem less than likely to have this effect. In their celebration of participation and community, they may even make the link between power, culture and governance even less visible.

Acknowledgements

This paper draws on two research projects conducted between 1996 and 2002. Both studies were funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway through its trust fund to the World Bank, and by the World Bank – Indonesia. We are very grateful
to Rachel Silvey for casting an extremely perceptive Indonesianist eye over the argument here, to Sam Hickey for an equally insightful view from development politics and to Simon Batterbury for his, as ever, supportive comments. We also wish to acknowledge the helpful and challenging comments of the two referees and Rob Potter’s guidance and remarkable efficiency as editor.

Notes

1. A number of geographers have engaged in these reflections as well as some – albeit fewer – political scientists, such as James Scott and Arun Agrawal.

2. In this paper, however, we do not pursue these questions of extra-local linkages, focusing our attention primarily on the village. We have explored them elsewhere in other work (Bebbington, 2000, 2001; Guggenheim, 2003).

3. Both studies were coordinated by Scott Guggenheim, who was also involved in the field work. The first study was led by Kamala Chandrakirana, and other team members included Pieter Evers, Kastorius Sinaga and Silvia Werner. Related econometric work was supported by Christiaan Grootaert – see Grootaert (1999) and Anthony Bebbington was involved in the design of the study at its inception. The second study was led by Anna Wetterberg and local team leaders included Leni Dharmawan, Erwin Fahmi and Yando Zakaria. Lant Pritchett, Vivi Alatas and Anthony Bebbington were each involved in the analysis and write-up stage of the study. Both studies also involved teams of field assistants and interviewers from local universities and NGOs.

4. In practice, the restudy was only completed in five of the initial six kabupatens as levels of violence and insecurity in parts of NTT prevented research, meaning that only 40 villages were covered in the second study.

5. A household questionnaire was also conducted, but is not discussed here. See Alatas, Pritchett and Wetterberg (2003).

6. Lehmann (1990) makes a similar point about NGOs in Latin America. He suggests that one of their most important effects on social change has been via the meanings related to modernity and citizenship that they convey at a village level.

7. This subsection draws heavily on another paper written by us (Bebbington et al., 2004).

8. It is important to note, however, that there were some exceptions. In some cases, traditional leaders (in Jambi) and clan heads (in NTT) appeared to maintain some role in village government. See also the case studies in Section IV of this paper.

9. Godril D. Yuwono planned to write this section but his other commitments left him little time to do it. His contribution in the discussion of the earlier draft, however, is greatly acknowledged.

10. Abangan or Javanism is a syncretic form of Islam and Hinduism, in contrast to ‘orthodox’ Muslim. Orthodox or puritan Muslims emphasize ritual prayer and attending mosque services, while Javanism is more mystic. See Geertz (1960), Hefner (1990).

11. All names of villages and subvillages are pseudonyms.

12. Given the level of state surveillance and control we had to ask for research permission at all levels from the provincial government (with a sponsor letter from a central government agency) down to the village government. In addition to the permits, courtesy calls helped ease the work (avoiding unnecessary questioning by officials).

13. Joglo is also the village centre where the village office is located, which happens to be close to the village head’s own residence.

14. In comparison, daily agricultural labour wages were Rp5000 plus three meals.

15. Thursday night is culturally and mystically significant in Javanese tradition.

16. This evening gambling sometimes coincides with subvillage meetings. The village head was clearly upset when her schedule to talk with villagers in this subvillage was changed because the subvillage head was out for his regular gambling. However, there was not much she could do.
17. These rituals are known as nengahkan nasi putih ayek ening, buka pintu lawang (literally, to open the door and offer white rice and plain water).
18. The Kerinci Seblat national park, which shares a border with the village and took parts of what were claimed as adat land, was established in 1982. In 1994, this shared border was staked.
19. This sharecropping system, adapted from Kerinci, was first applied in cinnamon planting only. Now it is used in planting new crops. Over time more rules have been added in the sharecropping contract.
20. For other studies of agrarian differentiation in Indonesia see, for instance, Li (1999a, 2002) and Hüskens and White (1989).
21. In private interviews members of the ruling elite often used the case of this South Sumatran pendatang – who became a community member by marriage – as an example of why it was necessary to issue various new ‘protective’ decrees. He bought land to plant coffee and invited people from his home town to work the land.

References


A. Bebbington et al. 2005.


